Skip to content
Methodology
Learn more →

Hands-on testing, verified data, official sources

Security14 min readOctober 15, 2026

How to Set Up Multisig on Hardware Wallets: 2-of-3, Safe and MetaMask

In October 2026 Ledger confirmed a hardware implant with an LTE module in devices sold by CryptoBilis, a reseller in Southeast Asia. Three months earlier a firmware bug was found in Coldcard: seeds were generated with insufficient randomness, and more than a thousand BTC were stolen from affected wallets. The people in both stories did everything by the book. A hardware wallet, a seed on paper. The money still left, because everything depended on a single device.

Multisig removes that single point of failure. To spend coins you need M signatures out of N keys, and the keys sit on different devices. If one device is hacked or swapped, one key isn't enough to move the money. In our breakdown of the tampered Ledger devices we recommended a 2-of-3 setup with devices from different brands. Below, step by step: how to do it for bitcoin, for Ethereum and EVM networks, and what to keep in mind for each manufacturer.

The setup has already been tested in real conditions. After the Coldcard incident, Nunchuk (August 11, 2026) and Unchained (August 12, 2026) reported that quorums built from keys of different manufacturers stayed intact. If at least one key of the quorum is not compromised, the attacker can't even find the wallet's addresses: that takes the public key of every participant, and on the blockchain a public key only becomes visible after a spend. Hence the Unchained advice: when you spend, empty the address completely and send the change to a new address.

Which setup to choose

  • 2-of-3. The standard for an individual: Sparrow, Trezor, Unchained and Coldcard offer it by default. Lose one key, the money is still there. Have one key stolen, the money is still there too.
  • 3-of-5. More margin, but also more hassle. Trezor considers more than five keys too complex for an individual. In bitcoin, moving from 2-of-3 to 3-of-5 is only possible with a new wallet, so decide in advance.
  • 2-of-4 and 2-of-5. According to Unchained, these protect better against losing keys.
  • 3-of-4 and 4-of-5. These protect better against theft: a thief has to collect more keys.
  • 2-of-2 (and any N-of-N setup). Losing any key locks you out for good. Casa and Unchained advise against it.

Our pick for most people

2-of-3 on three devices from different manufacturers. A thief with one key can't do anything, and you can survive losing one device or one seed phrase.

What to do before you start

  • Buy devices only from the manufacturer or an official reseller, and check the packaging. After CryptoBilis this is a hard rule. Ledger's advice: if you set up a device bought through that channel, move your funds to a new wallet with a new seed.
  • Use devices from different manufacturers. A shared firmware or supply chain flaw hits every device of the same brand at once.
  • Update the firmware before you create the seed. And in general, before any update you should have a backup of your seed.
  • Create a new seed on each device. The same seed on two devices gives you one key, not two.
  • If you use a passphrase, each participant has their own, written down separately. You can't change it after the wallet is created: the key would change.
  • Budget for fees. Multisig transactions are noticeably larger than regular ones, the fee is higher, and when the network is busy you feel it.

If Coldcard is part of your setup

In July 2026 a firmware bug made Coldcard generate seeds with insufficient randomness. Affected are Mk2 and Mk3, as well as Mk4, Mk5 and Q seeds created before the fixed firmware (5.6.0 for Mk4 and Mk5, 1.5.0Q for Q). The currently recommended versions are 5.6.3 and 1.5.3Q. Coinkite says it plainly: the update fixes future generation but does not repair an existing affected seed. The exception, according to the analysis, is a seed made with 50+ private dice rolls or with a strong passphrase; details are in the Coinkite migration guide. In its own 2-of-3 guide Coldcard advises: if any participant's seed was created on affected firmware, don't rely on that multisig and create a new wallet with new seeds. For a significant amount, roll the dice at least 50 times for each participant.

Option 1. Bitcoin 2-of-3 on three hardware wallets in Sparrow

For bitcoin you need a coordinator app. It builds the wallet from public keys, creates transactions and holds no keys itself. We use Sparrow: free, open source, version 2.5.5 was released on September 17, 2026. Over USB it works with Trezor, Ledger, Coldcard, BitBox02, Jade, KeepKey and OneKey, over QR codes with Passport, Jade, SeedSigner, Keystone and Krux, over microSD with Coldcard, Keystone and Passport. The Sparrow documentation gives the same advice we do: at least 2-of-3, devices from different manufacturers, stored in different places.

Other free coordinators: Nunchuk (self-managed mode, with a phone app), Electrum and Specter Desktop. If you want someone to help you, look at Casa (Standard plan at $250 a year, three keys, one of them held by Casa) or Unchained (the company holds one key out of three). Nunchuk also has paid wallets where the service holds one key. After the Coldcard incident Nunchuk disabled the hot phone key in its managed wallets.

1

Prepare three devices

On each one, first update the firmware, then create a new seed (on Coldcard, with dice rolls). Write it on paper or metal and check what you wrote.

2

Create a wallet in Sparrow

File > New Wallet, give the wallet a name.

3

Choose the type and threshold

Policy Type: Multi Signature, threshold 2 of 3. Script Type: Native SegWit (P2WSH). Derivation path per the BIP-48 standard: m/48'/0'/0'/2'.

4

Add three keys

For each of the three Keystores choose Connected Hardware Wallet > Scan > Import Keystore if the device is connected over USB, or Airgapped if it works over QR codes or microSD. Sparrow takes the xpub from the device, the extended public key. An xpub shows addresses and balances, but you can't spend anything with it.

5

Click Apply

Sparrow will offer to set a wallet password. It only protects the privacy of the file on your computer. It doesn't protect the money: the seeds on the devices do that.

6

Save the wallet configuration

Settings > Export. Save the Sparrow file, the output descriptor (a text description of how the wallet is built) or a BSMS file. Inside are the xpubs of all three participants, the threshold, the path and the script type. There are no private keys in it, but the file reveals every address and balance, so keep it as a confidential document. Put a copy next to each seed phrase, that is, in two or three places.

Configuration backup: this is where people lose money most often

Three seed phrases alone do not restore a multisig. Trezor says it plainly: if you lose the xpubs, you won't be able to send, even if you have enough private keys. Coldcard: without the configuration file, three seed phrases won't bring the vault back. BitBox: for 2-of-3, two devices are not enough, you need all the public keys. The math is this: two seeds plus the xpub of the third participant let you recover, two seeds without the third xpub don't.

7

Register the wallet on the devices

Ledger asks for registration itself (a Register request). BitBox02 registers the wallet the first time you display an address on it. Coldcard registers when you import the configuration file, and Jade registers too. Trezor and SeedSigner don't register the wallet, so with them checking addresses on other devices matters even more.

8

Compare the address on the screens

Receive > Display Address. Compare the full address on the screen of every device that can show it. Check every character, not just the first and last ones.

9

Make a test transaction

Send a small amount to the wallet, then spend it. Sparrow will create a PSBT, a partially signed transaction: a file the devices sign one after another. Sign with two devices and broadcast it to the network. Coldcard recommends going through the full signing round before you deposit a significant amount.

10

Test recovery

In a separate Sparrow profile, rebuild the wallet from the saved descriptor alone and check that the addresses match. Then test every key pair: A+B, A+C, B+C. Each pair must be able to sign.

11

Split up storage

Keep the seeds in different places, so that one event (a fire, a theft) can't take two keys at once. Don't store a seed next to its own device.

Brand specifics

What they all share: the device signs, the coordinator builds the wallet and the transactions, and you check the address on the screen. The differences are in who stores the wallet registration, how the device talks to the computer and what it can do at all.

Ledger

Nano S Plus, Nano X, Stax and Flex work as multisig participants in Sparrow or Nunchuk. You need the Bitcoin app version 2.1.0 or newer. On the first connection the device will ask you to register the wallet ("Register account"). Without registration Ledger only signs regular single-key wallets. The registration is stored by the coordinator (Sparrow remembers it since version 2.1.0), and when the set of keys changes you have to register again. The Ledger Wallet app (formerly Ledger Live) has no multisig. Buy only from Ledger or official resellers.

Trezor

Model T, Safe 3, Safe 5 and Safe 7. Trezor Suite doesn't support multisig, you'll need Sparrow, Electrum or Casa. The wallet isn't registered on the device, so check the address on the screens of several devices. In January 2026 Trezor found and fixed a display bug in multisig, so keep the firmware up to date.

Coldcard: multisig without a computer

Mk4, Mk5 and Q are the most convenient for building a multisig without a computer, using only microSD. First, the current firmware (5.6.3 or 1.5.3Q) and a new seed with dice rolls. Then:

  1. On each device: Settings > Multisig Wallets > Export XPUB. You get a file on the microSD with the path m/48'/0'/0'/2'.
  2. On one device choose Create Airgapped, type P2WSH, threshold 2. Coldcard will build the configuration file.
  3. On the other Coldcards: Import from File. All Coldcard participants must register the wallet before signing.
  4. Import the wallet into Sparrow: File > Import Wallet > Coldcard Multisig.
  5. Turn on Full Address View: by default Coldcard shows the address only partially.

Coldcard won't accept the same key twice, so you can't accidentally build a "multisig" from a single seed.

Keystone 3 Pro

For bitcoin multisig, use the bitcoin-only firmware (BTC-Only) version 1.1.0 or newer. Keystone talks to Sparrow over QR codes or microSD. In Sparrow: Settings > Export > Keystone Multisig > QR, on the Keystone: Add MultiSig Wallet.

BitBox02

Registration happens the first time you display an address from Sparrow (Receive > Display Address). The device shows the xpubs of all participants, compare them. Close BitBoxApp before connecting to Sparrow. BitBox02 doesn't support Taproot in multisig.

Blockstream Jade and Jade Plus

Registers and stores multisig configurations, verifies receive and change addresses. Works over USB and over QR codes.

Passport

Passport Core imports the configuration by QR code or from microSD. Passport Prime can be a participant but doesn't create a multisig itself, it needs an external coordinator like Sparrow.

SeedSigner

A DIY device with no memory. It doesn't store the configuration and works over QR codes together with Sparrow or Specter.

Tangem: why it doesn't fit

According to Tangem itself, it has no native multisig, and it doesn't work directly with Sparrow or Electrum. It's also missing from the supported device lists of Sparrow and Nunchuk. Tangem is not suitable for a bitcoin multisig built from devices of different brands.

Option 2. You only have two hardware wallets

The first thing you'll want to do is a 2-of-2 setup. Don't: lose or break either of the two devices along with its seed, and you have no access anymore. Casa and Unchained advise against this setup. The better choice is 2-of-3, where the third key comes from one of the options below.

  • A third device from another brand. The most reliable option: all three keys are yours and all three are hardware.
  • MetaMask, but only in Safe for Ethereum and EVM networks. That's option 3 below.
  • A key held by a service: Casa, Unchained or Nunchuk. All three are paid. The service holds one key, and with your two you spend without it.

Remember the configuration: in 2-of-3, your two seeds plus the xpub of the third participant let you recover. So the xpub of the service key or the third device must also be in your backup.

Option 3. Ethereum and EVM networks: Safe, two hardware wallets and MetaMask

Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe) is a smart contract wallet with a signature threshold. Safe's help center describes the usual setup for an individual: three signers (one MetaMask and two hardware wallets), threshold 2. MetaMask and one hardware wallet for everyday use, the second hardware wallet kept separately as a backup.

1

Prepare your Ledger

Update the Ethereum app on your Ledger to version 1.22.3 or newer and enable the Contract Data setting in it. In the Safe interface you can pick Ledger directly, and Safe recommends connecting it that way rather than through MetaMask.

2

Connect the wallets to the Safe interface

Safe accepts MetaMask, Rabby and WalletConnect. MetaMask itself works with Ledger, Trezor, Lattice, Keystone (over QR), OneKey and other devices.

3

Create the Safe

Enter the addresses of the three owners (MetaMask and two hardware wallets) and threshold 2. Creating it costs gas. A Safe is created separately in each network, and in each network it is a separate wallet.

4

Test with a small amount

Deposit a little and make a test transfer, signing it with two owners. That way you see the whole signing path before you trust the Safe with serious money.

How to check a transaction before signing

On February 21, 2025, more than 401,000 ETH was stolen from Bybit, and nobody hacked the keys. The attackers swapped the code of the Safe interface: the signers saw a regular transfer, but signed a contract replacement. The takeaway is simple: you check the transaction on the device screen, not in the browser. It's better to sign from a different device, not the one where the Safe interface is open. According to Safe's help center, check:

  • the destination address (to);
  • the amount (value);
  • the data (data), decoded in a decoder;
  • operation: 0 means a regular call, 1 means delegatecall, and that is dangerous;
  • nonce, the transaction's sequence number;
  • safeTxHash and the other hashes on the hardware wallet screen. Tenderly, OpenZeppelin Safe Utils and safe-tx-hashes-util help you compute them independently.

Safe's rule

If you can't verify a transaction, don't sign it.

Ledger: Ethereum app no older than 1.22.3

In bulletin LSB-024 of August 27, 2026, Ledger reported: in Ethereum app versions 1.19.0 through 1.22.2, with a long list of operations the device could show one operation but sign all of them. Ledger names a compromised multisig interface as the main threat. Update to 1.22.3 or newer.

Since September 2026 Trezor has clear signing for Ethereum: the device decodes the actions on its screen. It works for supported contracts, and for the rest Trezor warns about blind signing.

If you lose one key

Replace the owner: Settings > Owners > Replace owner. The threshold is set in Settings > Setup. The remaining owners confirm the replacement within the threshold. That's why the threshold is set below the number of owners: with 2-of-3, the two remaining keys can easily replace the lost one. If there aren't enough signatures left for the threshold, there is no normal way to regain access.

Solana: Squads

On Solana, multisig is done in Squads. Ledger connects through Phantom or Solflare, but for Squads you'll have to enable Blind Signing on the Ledger. That means you won't see the transaction details on the device screen, and the main protection from the Safe option is weaker here. You can add up to 10 participants when creating it. Don't use a 1/1 setup, that's a regular wallet with extra steps. Creation costs a one-time 0.1 SOL plus a small rent.

Common mistakes

  • No backup of the configuration (the descriptor or the Sparrow file). You have the seeds, but you can't spend.
  • All devices from one brand. A single firmware or supply chain flaw takes down the whole setup.
  • One seed on two devices. That's one key, not two.
  • A 2-of-2 setup. Losing any key locks you out for good.
  • A seed stored next to its own device, or two seeds stored in the same place.
  • The passphrase was changed after the wallet was created. The key became different.
  • Firmware updated without a seed backup.
  • The address was checked only on the computer screen, not on the devices.
  • Reusing one address. Multisig addresses already look different, and reuse hurts privacy even more.
  • Skipped the recovery test. You'll find the mistake in your backup on the day you need it.
  • Signed a transaction in Safe after checking it only in the browser.
  • The device wasn't bought from the manufacturer or an official reseller.

No illusions

Multisig doesn't give you 100% protection. It removes one specific problem: one hacked, swapped or lost device no longer means lost money. The discipline with backups and transaction checks is still on you.

FAQ

Before accepting coins to your new wallet from unknown senders, check the address with our AML check tool. Other wallet tools are collected in the wallet tools section.

CoinMagnetic

CoinMagnetic Team

Crypto investors since 2017. We trade with our own money and test every exchange ourselves.

Updated: October 2026